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I Think It Was a Tuesday

A small set of songs catch themselves remembering wrong, and say so inside the song. They are describing retrieval more accurately than most of us manage when asked.

The verse that argues with itself

Most songs about the past are confident. The singer remembers, we believe them, and the remembering is the furniture rather than the subject. A much smaller set does something stranger: it remembers out loud and then doubts the remembering, in the same breath, without resolving it.

John Lennon’s Strawberry Fields Forever is the clearest case in popular music. It is about a real place — the garden of a Salvation Army children’s home in Liverpool, near where he grew up, where he played as a boy. Almost every claim the song makes about it is hedged, qualified, or withdrawn by the line that follows. The narrator corrects himself mid-sentence, states a position and then says he is not sure he agrees with it, and keeps arriving at the idea that nothing he is describing can be relied upon. It is a song about an actual garden that declines to assert anything about the garden.

Read as songwriting, that is a studied psychedelic vagueness. Read as a description of what retrieval actually feels like when you attend to it closely, it is close to a laboratory report.

Remembering is not reading

The intuition almost everyone carries is that memory is storage: the event went in, it sits there, recall opens the drawer. If that were true, hedging would be a sign that the drawer was poorly filled, and a confident account would be a well-filled one.

Frederic Bartlett took that intuition apart in 1932. He had people read an unfamiliar folk tale and retell it repeatedly over weeks and months, and found they did not simply lose detail. They rebuilt it — smoothing unfamiliar elements into familiar ones, dropping what did not fit their expectations, and importing material that had never been in the story.1 Crucially, the retellings were delivered with no sense of having invented anything.

How little it takes to bend an account was shown by Elizabeth Loftus and John Palmer in 1974. People watched a filmed car crash and were asked how fast the cars were going when they hit each other — or smashed into each other. The verb alone moved the estimated speed, and a week later the people who had been given the stronger verb were likelier to report having seen broken glass that was never in the film.2

There is a mechanism underneath this. Work on reconsolidation found that a memory, once retrieved, becomes briefly unstable and has to be stored again to persist — in rats, blocking protein synthesis in the amygdala after recall removed a fear memory that was perfectly intact until it was recalled.3 How far that generalises to a human recollection of a summer is genuinely contested, and worth not overstating. But the direction is clear enough: a memory is not inert while you hold it up to the light.

Which makes the hedging songs the accurate ones. Every recall is partly a rewrite, so a narrator who is unsure is reporting the process correctly, and one who is certain is reporting the feeling of the process rather than the thing itself.

Confidence is the part that does not fade

If accuracy quietly decays while the sense of certainty does not, you would expect people to be most sure about exactly the memories that have drifted furthest. That is more or less what the flashbulb research found.

Jennifer Talarico and David Rubin collected accounts of the morning of 11 September 2001 from students the day after, and again at intervals afterwards, alongside accounts of an ordinary personal event from the same week. The vivid public memory decayed in accuracy at much the same rate as the mundane one. What set it apart was that people stayed confident in it, and went on rating it as vivid, while it changed underneath them.4 A ten-year follow-up found the same divergence persisting: inconsistency accumulating, confidence not.5

The sharpest version of this came a decade earlier. Ulric Neisser and Nicole Harsch asked students how they heard about the Challenger explosion the morning after it happened, and asked the same students again two and a half years later. Many of the later accounts were wrong in their central details — where they were, who told them. Some students, shown their own handwriting from the day after, did not believe it, and a few maintained the later version anyway.6 Daniel Schacter later grouped failures of this kind as one of memory’s ordinary operating characteristics rather than a malfunction: the same reconstructive machinery that makes memory flexible and useful is what makes it suggestible.7

Put plainly: vividness and accuracy are separate things, and we read the first as evidence of the second. The songs that hedge are doing the rare and difficult thing of holding them apart.

The reunion that fails the memory

There is a second, quieter way a song can admit it remembers wrong, which is to put the memory next to the thing itself and let the comparison do the work.

Dan Fogelberg’s Same Old Lang Syne runs on exactly that. The narrator meets a former lover by accident in a grocery store on Christmas Eve. They buy a drink, sit in her car because there is nowhere else to go, and try to have the conversation the occasion seems to call for. It does not arrive. They run out of things to say, the reunion ends politely, and he walks away into weather that has turned. The song never says the memory was inflated. It simply shows the real person failing to match it, and leaves the arithmetic to the listener.

Bob Seger’s Night Moves works from the other end. It recalls a particular teenage summer in some physical detail and is then explicit that what he is describing was not love, which is a correction applied to the memory from the present. The last section drops out of the story entirely to describe waking in the night, years later, thinking about it — the song stops being about the summer and becomes about the act of recalling it.

Don Henley’s The Boys of Summer finds the past returned as merchandise: the famous image of countercultural iconography stuck to an expensive car. The memory has not just faded, it has been repackaged and sold back. And Joni Mitchell’s Both Sides, Now performs the full retreat in three verses — examining clouds, love and life from two angles each, then closing each time by saying she does not understand the thing she has just described from both sides.

Four different mechanisms: the reunion that disproves the memory, the correction applied later, the past commercialised, and the plain admission of not knowing. All four amount to the same confession.

Why a song can say this and a person cannot

The interesting question is not why a handful of songwriters got this right. It is why the rest of us so rarely do it out loud.

A song is permitted to be ambivalent. Nobody cross-examines a lyric, and a chorus that admits confusion is read as honest rather than unhelpful. A person being asked to remember is in a different position. The social reward is for a clean account: the hedge gets treated as an unhelpful answer, the confident version gets treated as the useful one, and over several retellings the qualifications are quietly sanded off because nobody wanted them. This is also how a witness becomes certain — a process worth reading about in The Witness Who Was Sure, where two fictional witnesses are confident and wrong in exactly the ways the research predicts.

The practical consequence is counter-intuitive and worth sitting with: within a single account, the confident version is the more suspicious one, because confidence is what survives the drift. We go into this at more length in Why You Shouldn’t Trust Your Memory.

What this means for what you write down

If a memory changes a little each time it is handled, then a story only written down after forty years of retelling is a record of the retellings. That is not an argument against writing it down. It is an argument about how.

On the Memory Experience, a moment on a memorial or an occasion is its own entry with its own date, so a half-sure recollection can sit beside a documented one without the two being merged into a single confident paragraph. Several people can add their own account of the same day, and those accounts are allowed to differ.

If you are new here, what the parts are and how they fit together is the place to start. And if you want the other half of this — why a song hands back a moment so forcefully in the first place — that is Songs That Remember for Us.

References

  1. Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
  2. Loftus, E. F., & Palmer, J. C. (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destruction: an example of the interaction between language and memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13(5), 585–589.
  3. Nader, K., Schafe, G. E., & LeDoux, J. E. (2000). Fear memories require protein synthesis in the amygdala for reconsolidation after retrieval. Nature, 406(6797), 722–726.
  4. Talarico, J. M., & Rubin, D. C. (2003). Confidence, not consistency, characterizes flashbulb memories. Psychological Science, 14(5), 455–461.
  5. Hirst, W., Phelps, E. A., Meksin, R., Vaidya, C. J., Johnson, M. K., Mitchell, K. J., et al. (2015). A ten-year follow-up of a study of memory for the attack of September 11, 2001. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(3), 604–623.
  6. Neisser, U., & Harsch, N. (1992). Phantom flashbulbs: false recollections of hearing the news about Challenger. In E. Winograd & U. Neisser (Eds.), Affect and Accuracy in Recall (pp. 9–31). Cambridge University Press.
  7. Schacter, D. L. (1999). The seven sins of memory: insights from psychology and cognitive neuroscience. American Psychologist, 54(3), 182–203.